We use a global dataset with information about 210,000 corporations in 142 countries to investigate whether tax avoidance by multinational …rms is more prevalent in less developed countries. We propose a novel approach to studying crossborder pro…t shifting, which has relatively low data requirements and is therefore particularly well-suited for the context of developing countries. Our results consistently show that the sensitivity of reported pro…ts to pro…t shifting incentives is negatively related to the level of economic and institutional development. This may explain why many developing countries opt for low corporate tax rates in spite of urgent revenue needs and severe constraints on the use of other tax bases.
Introduction
There is solid empirical evidence that multinational …rms make sizable tax savings by shifting pro…ts from countries with high corporate taxes to countries with low corporate taxes and the various pro…t shifting techniques are fairly well understood. 1 The global loss of government revenue caused by pro…t shifting is most likely counted in hundreds of billions of dollars and has been increasing over time. 2 While almost all of the available evidence concerns developed countries, considerable uncertainty remains about the scale of pro…t shifting in developing countries. Recent policy papers paint a bleak picture of rampant pro…t shifting in low-income economies (UNCTAD, 2016; GFI, 2015), but have been shown to su¤er from serious methodological weaknesses (Forstater, 2016; Johannesen and Pirttilä, 2016 ).
This paper uses micro-data to study pro…t shifting and to investigate whether the intensity of pro…t shifting di¤ers systematically between countries with di¤erent levels of economic and institutional development. The micro-data comes from the global …rm database Orbis and includes …nancial information about individual corporations as well as ownership informating serving to link corporations that belong to the same multinational group. Our estimating sample covers 210,000 corporations in 142 countries, including 25 ,000 corporations in 94 low/middle-income countries.
Our empirical strategy to detect pro…t shifting builds on the most widely used method, which relates the reported pro…ts of each corporation to its inputs of labor and capital and its tax incentive to engage in pro…t shifting with foreign a¢ liates (Hines and Rice, 1994 ; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) . 3 To the extent that corporations systematically report lower pro…ts when they face higher taxes, this is taken as evidence of pro…t shifting. We develop this methodology along two dimensions to improve identi…cation and address issues arising in the context of developing countries where data quality is lower and heterogeneity across …rms and countries is more pronounced.
First, contrary to the norm in the literature, we are careful not to identify pro…t shifting from variation in the domestic tax rate facing corporations. A high domestic tax rate creates an incentive to shift pro…ts to foreign a¢ liates, but also induces a range of other behavioral responses that reduce the tax base. Hence, a negative correlation between domestic tax rates and reported pro…ts may re ‡ect purely domestic responses.
We improve the identi…cation of pro…t shifting by relying exclusively on variation in the tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates.
Second, we propose to identify aggresive pro…t shifting with a zero-pro…t dummy variable that indicates whether pro…ts fall within a narrow range around zero. The global tax bill of a multinational group is minimized when all pro…ts are shifted to the corporation facing the lowest tax rate so we should observe corporations reporting close to zero pro…ts more frequently when pro…ts are shifted more aggressively. We therefore estimate how the propensity to report zero pro…ts correlates with the tax incentives to shift pro…ts. This is particularly attractive in the context of developing countries because it does not require precise measurement of factor inputs and makes no parametric assumptions about the technology that transforms factor inputs into pro…ts.
Our results consistently show that pro…t shifting responses to taxation are stronger in less developed countries. Starting with the novel extensive margin, when tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates are lower, corporations are generally more likely to report zero pro…ts and this e¤ect is stronger in less developed countries: increasing economic or institutional development by one standard deviation dampens the e¤ect of a 10 percentage point decrease in foreign tax rates on the propensity to report zero pro…ts by 0.5-1 percentage point. Turning to the well-known intensive margin, when the tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates are lower, corporations generally report less pro…ts (conditional on positive reporting) and this e¤ect is stronger in less developed countries: increasing economic or institutional development by one standard deviation dampens the e¤ect of a 10 percentage point decrease in foreign tax rates on reported pro…ts by around 5 percentage points. 4 Our estimates suggest that the tax responsiveness of total reported pro…ts is around 20% larger when accounting for the extensive margin.
Our …nding that countries at lower levels of economic and institutional development are more exposed to cross-border pro…t shifting may help explain why they, often in spite of urgent revenue needs, do not raise corporate taxes rates. When …rms respond strongly to pro…t shifting incentives, increases in tax rates generate little or no increases in government revenue. The inability to contain pro…t shifting therefore constitutes an e¤ective constraint on tax policy and low rates may be the best feasible policy given this constraint. This illustrates the broader …nding that …scal capacity tends to be low in developing countries (Besley and Persson 2013) . 5 We contribute to a small existing literature on pro…t shifting in developing countries.
Fuest, Riedel (2011, 2013) use micro-data to show that intra-…rm …nancing is particularly tax sensitive in developing countries. Taking a macro perspective, Crivelli, de Mooij and Keen (2015) demonstrate that corporate tax externalities, the sum of real investment and pro…t shifting responses to corporate taxation, are more pronounced in developing countries. Finally, consistent with widespread pro…t shifting in developing countries, Johannesen and Larsen (2016) …nd that the value of multinational oil, gas and mining …rms decreased signi…cantly in response to new …nancial disclosure rules. To the best of our knowledge, no existing paper studies the responsiveness of reported pro…ts to tax incentives using micro-data from low-and middle income countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 develops and applies a novel framework to studying aggressive pro…t shifting; Section 4 improves and applies the standard framework for studying pro…t shifting; Section 5 concludes. 4 These results are consistent with the broader literature on corporate tax evasion in developing countries, which tends to …nd that evasion among small and medium-sized domestic …rms is pervasive (e.g. Best et al, 2015; Johnson et al., 2000) . 5 An alternative interpretation of our results, which resonates with the theory by Hong and Smart (2010), is that developing countries deliberately allow pro…t shifting to achieve lower e¤ective taxation of …rms with high mobility. Starting from the full Orbis database, corporations enter our gross sample if they satisfy two requirements. First, they must have at least one foreign a¢ liate; we do not consider purely national …rms for the simple reason that these …rms cannot engage in international pro…t shifting. Second, there must be basic …nancial information about the corporation in Orbis; even the least demanding regression framework requires that total assets, pro…ts and the industry classi…cation is observed. Both requirements imply that our gross sample is far smaller than the total number of corporations in Orbis. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the largest estimating sample of corporations used in the cross-sectional regressions. 7 The information is for the …nancial years end- 6 Our dataset was drawn from the database in October 2013 and the corporate groups re ‡ect ownership information at that time. To the extent that corporate groups have changed between the time when …nancial information is reported and the time when the ownership information is observed, the incentives for pro…t shifting may be mismeasured. This measurement problem applies to many empirical studies of pro…t shifting (See Dischinger and Riedel, 2011 for a discussion). 7 Our estimating sample is always smaller than the gross sample for three reasons. First, we exclude observations with a return on assets above 96% (the 99th percentile in the gross sample) to avoid that corporations with implausibly high pro…ts, for instance due to measurement error, drive our results. Second, some observations with negative returns are dropped. In the standard empirical framework, the logarithmic transformation of pro…ts implies that only observations with strictly positive pro…ts enter the estimating sample. Our novel "zero-pro…t" framework, in principle, allows observations with negative pro…ts by relying on a dummy transformation of pro…ts rather than a logarithmic transformation. However, this would be problematic since losses change the marginal tax incentives in highly complex ways. In a simple static analysis, corporate groups always have a tax incentive to shift pro…ts to loss-making corporations regardless of the tax rates. Taking into account dynamic aspects, incentives depend on tax rates as well as rules for loss-carry forward and expected future pro…ts. We sidestep these intricacies and include only observations with strictly positive pro…ts and pro…ts su¢ ciently close to zero to switch on the "zero-pro…t" dummy, that is returns on assets between -0.5% and 0.5%. Finally, we exclude the ing in 2010, which is the year with the highest data coverage in developing countries. 8 Columns (1)-(3) and Columns (4)-(6) describe the subsamples of low/middle-income ("developing) and high-income ("developed") countries respectively (summary statistics for the full sample are in Table A1 in the Online Appendix). 9 - Table 1 around herePanels A and B describe the income and institutional variables that we use to analyze how development shapes tax avoidance. There is considerable income variation in the global sample: GNI per capita is only around $5,000 for the average corporation in low/middle-income countries compared to $36,000 in high-income countries. To make our results comparable across development measures with di¤erent scales, our regressions employ a standardized measure of GNI where, by construction, the global mean is zero and one unit represents one standard deviation in the global distribution.
The lower income levels in low/middle-income countries are mirrored by lower quality of governance as indicated by standardized measures of corruption, government e¤ec-tiveness, political stability, regulatory capacity, rule of law and political accountability (World Bank, 2015) . In all six dimensions, the governance outcome facing an average corporation in low/middle-income countries is considerably worse than that facing an average corporation in high-income countries; in most cases the di¤erence is around 1.5 standard deviations.
Since the six variables capturing di¤erent dimensions of governance are highly correlated, we use the …rst principal component of the governance variables as an index of the quality of governance in the main analysis. The correlation coe¢ cient between the …rst principal component and the individual governance variables ranges from 0.79 (political smallest corporations with assets below $1 million. 8 Notably in developing countries, there is often a considerable time lag from the ending of the …nancial year until accounts are closed, …nancial information is published and this information is adapted by Bureau van Dijk and entered into Orbis. 9 The classi…cation follows World Bank conventions: countries with GNI / capita below $12,275 (in 2010) are low/middle-income or "developing" countries while countries with GNI / capita above this threshold are high-income or "developed" countries. stability) to 0.99 (rule of law) and thus captures most of the variation in the quality of governance (Table A2 in the Online Appendix shows the full correlation matrix). Table 1 describes the …nancial information in Orbis. Corporations in low/middle-income countries have almost exactly the same size as corporations in highincome countries in terms of assets, but are larger in terms of the number of employees, which is consistent with a more labor-intensive production. Average reported pro…ts are somewhat higher in low/middle-income countries when measured in absolute terms, but the pro…tability is very similar across the two groups of countries whether measured as the return on assets or the probability that the return on assets falls within a narrow range around zero (between -0.5% and 0.5%).
Panel C in
Panel D describes the tax variables that determine the incentive to shift pro…ts within the corporate group. The variables are computed on the basis of statutory corporate tax rates taken from the KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Tables and information on corporate group structures from Orbis. Absent special tax regimes, statutory corporate tax rates are precisely the e¤ective tax rates that apply to the marginal dollar of pro…ts and thus capture the incentive to manipulate the tax base with pro…t shifting (Devereux and Ma¢ ni, 2007). 10 Our estimates are generally robust to the presence of special tax regimes that reduce e¤ective taxation below the statutory tax rate under mild assumptions as explained below.
We report summary statistics on domestic corporate rates and the two measures of foreign tax rates used in the empirical analysis: the simple average of the corporate tax rates facing foreign corporations belonging to the same group and the corporate tax rate facing the foreign parent. Both variables capture the foreign tax cost associated with shifting one dollar of pro…ts away from a given corporation; the former under the assumption that the same amount of pro…ts are shifted to each foreign a¢ liate and the latter assuming that pro…ts are shifted to the parent company. Some studies have used 10 This assumes that the parent company is located in a country with a territorial tax system where the pro…ts of foreign subsidiaries are not subject to domestic taxation. When the parent company is instead located in a country with a worldwide tax system, the pro…ts of foreign subsidiaries are subject to domestic taxation upon repatriation so that the combined domestic and foreign tax rate is at least as high as the domestic tax rate. the average foreign a¢ liate tax rate weighted by assets arguing that it is less costly to conceal pro…t shifting the larger the a¢ liate (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) ; however, this is problematic because information about assets is often unavailable and because the asset weights are themselves endogenous to tax rates and pro…t shifting. 11 We balance these concerns by using two distinct foreign tax measures: one that averages tax rates across all foreign a¢ liates without applying asset weights and another that is simply the tax rate in the parent country where the bulk of economic activity is typically located. 12 The table shows that, in our sample, tax rates are lower in low/middle-income countries than in high-income countries: the domestic tax rate facing an average corporation in the former group is around 21% compared to around 29% for an average corporation in the latter. Also the tax rates of parents and foreign a¢ liates tend to be somewhat lower in countries with lower incomes. 13 Finally, we illustrate the geographical composition of our estimating sample in Panel E. As noted by several previous studies (e.g. OECD; 2015), a large fraction of the corporations, for which …nancial information is available in Orbis, are located in Europe. This is notably true within the group of high-income countries (94%) and to a somewhat lesser extent in the group of low/middle-income countries (75%). The geographical composition implies that much of the variation in income and institutional variables that identi…es the development gradient in pro…t shifting comes from Europe. In other words, our results largely derive from a comparison of developed countries in Western Europe and devel- 11 A few papers studying pro…t shifting through the intra-…rm capital structure argue that the relevant foreign tax parameter for the pro…t shifting decision is the lowest tax rate facing any foreign a¢ liate (e.g. Buettner and Wamser, 2013) . This is arguably true in the context of internal loans since all the …nancial assets of a …rm can be allocated to a single low-tax a¢ liate with no substantial activities. However, it is not true in the context of transfer mispricing because shifting very large pro…ts to an a¢ liate that accounts for a small share of the …rm's internal trade, requires extreme and thus easily detectable transfer mispricing (for a formal model, see Johannesen, 2010) . 12 In our estimating sample, parent countries account for around 50% of …xed assets, employees and turnover. Dischinger, Knoll and Riedel (2013) provide evidence on the special role of the parent company in pro…t shifting. 13 Since our panel models are e¤ectively identi…ed from changes in the tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates, we carefully document the time variation in foreign tax rate changes in Table A3 in the Online Appendix. In general, tax changes happen frequently. In any given year, between 15% and 40% of corporations in a given income group experience a change in the foreign parent tax rate. Even more, between 30% and 70%, experience a change in the average foreign a¢ liate tax rate.
oping countries in Eastern Europe. Within Europe, income levels range from less than $3,000 in Georgia and Ukraine to around $80,000 in Norway and Switzerland and the continent includes countries like Russia and Bosnia, which score well below the global average on all dimensions of governance, as well as countries like Sweden and Finland, which are among the best governed in the world.
Measurement and identi…cation
The use of accounting information to study tax motivated pro…t shifting poses several challenges. First, book pro…ts are not identical to taxable pro…ts and the book-tax di¤erence may vary systematically across countries and over the business cycle. This highlights another advantage of employing country-time dummies in the empirical model:
since we control fully for the average book-tax di¤erence in a country in a given year, we do not need to assume that book-tax di¤erences are uncorrelated with corporate tax rates and the level of development.
14 Second, some forms of tax avoidance do not aim to shift pro…ts from high-tax to low-tax countries, but to ensure that pro…ts are not taxable in any country. 15 These forms of tax avoidance do not leave any traces in accounting data and are not captured in our estimates. Hence, strictly speaking, we are not necessarily estimating the full extent of all forms of tax avoidance.
A potential concern with our empirical approach is measurement error in the tax incentive to shift pro…ts due to imperfect coverage of the Orbis database. As illustrated in Table 1 , Orbis covers some countries better than others and it is plausible that coverage is particularly low in tax havens infamous for …nancial secrecy. A recent study conducts Some mismeasurement surely persists due to Orbis' partial coverage as well as our inability to account for special tax regimes that reduce e¤ective marginal tax rates on pro…ts below the statutory rates. In our preferred panel speci…cation with corporation …xed e¤ects where we identify from changes in foreign tax rates, however, the measurement error is plausibly uncorrelated with unexplained changes in pro…ts, in which case the resulting bias is unambiguously toward zero.
A …nal feature of the data that deserves to be discussed is the fact that we rely on a snapshot of corporate group structures. On the one hand, this adds another source of measurement error in the tax incentives for pro…t shifting because we do not account for changes in these incentives created by changes in the group structure. On the other hand, it addresses the concern that variation in the pro…t shifting incentives deriving from …rms'own location choices is inherently endogenous. We e¤ectively disregard this source of variation by holding ownership structures constant and only identifying from the variation in pro…t shifting incentives that come from plausibly exogenous changes in statutory corporate tax rates in foreign countries.
Despite its limitations, Orbis remains an extremely useful data source because of the unique combination of unconsolidated accounting information from a large set of countries and ownership information linking corporations that belong to the same group.
Aggressive pro…t shifting: a new approach
This section …rst argues that aggressive pro…t shifting, the shifting of all pro…ts to lowtax a¢ liates, requires a new empirical framework where the key outcome is the reporting of zero pro…ts. It then investigates empirically, with graphical analysis and in regression models, whether the prevalence of zero pro…ts correlates with the tax incentive to shift pro…ts in line with the theoretical prediction and whether this correlation varies systematically across countries with di¤erent income levels.
Theoretical motivation
The standard framework for studying pro…t shifting can be illustrated with the following simple example. A multinational …rm consists of two pro…table corporations: one in country H with a high tax rate t H and one in a country L with a low tax rate t L . Shifting a dollar of pro…ts from the former to the latter yields a tax saving of t
creates a cost in the form of concealment e¤orts, expected tax penalties, or similar. 16 Assuming that shifting costs, C, are a convex function of the amount of pro…ts shifted, S, the …rm will optimally shift pro…ts from H to L until t
. This implies that a small increase in t H or decrease in t L induce a small increase in pro…t shifting; less pro…ts are reported in H and more are reported in L for a given amount of production inputs in the two countries. The empirical pro…t shifting literature is largely devoted to 16 Strictly speaking, the tax saving of t H t L assumes that tax systems are territorial (foreign pro…ts are exemt from domestic taxation) and not worldwide (foreign pro…ts are subject to domestic taxation with credit for foreign taxes paid). If, for instance, the corporation in H owned the corporation in L, shifting a dollar of pro…t from H to L under a worldwide tax system would create an immediate tax saving of t H t L as described, but also an additional tax bill of t H t L in H upon repatriation of pro…ts to the parent company. Studies of pro…t shifting generally ignore repatriation taxes (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) because almost all developed countries have territorial tax systems and because the few remaining worldwide tax systems typically allow the repatriation tax to be deferred inde…nitely. However, recent evidence from the U.K. suggests that repatriation taxes may a¤ect investment decisions in spite of deferral (Liu, 2018) , which may be particularly relevant in the context of developing countries where worldwide tax systems are still in place in many countries (e.g. China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey). Our analysis also does not account for Controlled Foreign Company rules under which certain types of income (e.g. interest, dividends) realized in foreign tax havens are subject to immediate domestic taxation (Cli¤ord, 2017) . Ignoring these features of parent country tax systems should not bias the estimated development gradient in pro…t shifting since the cross-country distribution of ultimate ownership is very similar for corporations in high-income and low/middle-income countries, as shown in Figure A1 in the Online Appendix.
testing this theoretical prediction.
This framework relies on the implicit assumption that shifting costs are large enough to sustain an optimum with positive reported pro…ts in both countries. If shifting costs are su¢ ciently small, however, the …rm optimally chooses to report all its pro…ts in L and zero pro…ts in H. More precisely, if t H t L > C 0 (S) at the allocation where all pro…ts in H are shifted to L, this is the …rm's optimum, because the tax bill in H is then zero and cannot be reduced any further by shifting pro…ts to L. 17 Clearly, this pro…t allocation is insensitive to small changes in tax rates; the key theoretical prediction of the standard framework no longer holds.
Moreover, it is also assumed that shifting costs are variable, whereas in reality they may have an important …xed component. 18 If shifting costs are …xed at C, the …rm optimally chooses either to report all pro…ts in L or to report pro…ts truthfully in both countries. Letting H denote true pro…ts in H, full shifting is optimal when
The pro…t allocation is not a¤ected by small tax changes except in the special case where
While this simple example illustrates the limitations of the standard framework as a guide to empirical analysis with micro-data, it also suggests an alternative approach that focuses on the prevalence of zero pro…ts. 19 Whether full shifting occurs because variable shifting costs are low or shifting costs are …xed altogether, we should expect a more frequent reporting of zero pro…ts among …rms with a large saving from pro…t shifting, 17 Technically, an optimum where negative pro…ts are reported in H would require that t L = C 0 (S). This is not possible given that marginal shifting costs are positive, C 0 (S) > 0, and there is some taxation of pro…ts in L, t L > 0. Intuitively, when reported pro…ts in H are negative, reducing shifting to L by one dollar, yields a tax saving of t L in L with no o¤setting tax cost in H. In a dynamic model where tax rules allow …rms to carry tax losses forward, there may be circumstances in which it is optimal for the …rm to report negative pro…ts in H (under the sustained assumption that true pro…ts are positive) and report more than all of its pro…ts in L. There are at least two reasons to believe that this is not empirically relevant. First, there is a liquidity cost: by shifting one dollar less from H to L in the current period and one dollar more in the next period, the …rm would obtain the same outcome in H and postpone tax payments of t L by one period in L. Second, there is a probability that the tax loss in H is not utilized, for instance because the corporation in H is unpro…table during the entire period where losses can be carried forward (often 5 years). 18 Shifting cost components such as consultant fees, costs of operating shell corporations and risk of negative publicity are presumably largely independent of the scale of the pro…t shifting and could reasonably be considered …xed. 19 The identi…cation problems relating to …xed costs and corner solutions do not arise in the early contributions to the literature that rely on aggregate data (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994).
i.e. …rms for which t H t L is large.
Graphical evidence
Figures 1a-1b provide a graphical analysis of the prevalence of zero pro…ts by showing raw histograms of the return to assets in high-income and low/middle-income countries respectively. The histograms are shown separately for corporations with di¤erent tax incentives to shift pro…ts as measured by the parent tax rate: corporations whose parent is facing a higher tax rate than themselves (red line) and corporations whose parent is facing a lower tax rate than themselves (blue line).
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- Figure 1 around here -
The …gures o¤er clear evidence of bunching at zero pro…ts regardless of the pro…t shifting incentives. In each sample, more than 2% of corporations report a return to assets between 0% and 0.1%. By comparison, less than 1% report a return to assets in the similar-sized windows between -1% and -0.9% and between 1% and 1.1%. 21 While bunching at zero pro…ts among corporations with high-tax parents cannot be explained with pro…t shifting, it can be rationalized with other tax-and non-tax incentives. The marginal incentive to reduce the tax base through other channels than pro…t shifting, whether legitimate (e.g. external leverage) or illegitimate (e.g. nonreporting of income), changes fundamentally at zero pro…ts where there are no more taxes to pay. Hence, corporations with no incentives to shift pro…ts abroad may bunch at zero pro…ts for domestic tax reasons. In the accounting literature, bunching at zero pro…ts has been discussed and interpreted as evidence that …rm managers have discretion 20 A previous study has documented that foreign-owned corporations are more likely to report pro…ts close to zero than domestic …rms, but does not study how the propensity to report zero pro…ts varies across foreign-owned corporations with di¤erent tax incentives for pro…t shifting (Grubert, Goodspeed and Swenson, 1993) . 21 To be precise, the fact that there is signi…cant mass at negative levels of reported pro…ts is fully consistent with the point made in footnote 17 that …rms should not be expected to shift more than all of its pro…ts in H to L. The mass below zero pro…ts is much more likely to re ‡ect that true pro…ts are negative.
to shift pro…ts across …nancial years and choose to report slightly positive pro…ts in years where true pro…ts are slightly negative to maintain a record of "consistent pro…tability" (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) .
From a pro…t shifting perspective, the interesting feature is therefore not bunching at zero pro…ts per se, but that the magnitude of the bunching varies systematically with the incentives to shift pro…ts.
In low/middle-income countries, the fraction reporting a return between 0% and 0.1% is around 5% for corporations with low-tax parents, but only 2.5% for corporations with high-tax parents. Similarly, there is more mass immediately to the left and to the right of this interval for corporations with low-tax parents than for those with high-tax parents.
Assuming that true returns are distributed similarly for the two groups, the striking difference in reported returns close to zero is suggestive of aggressive pro…t shifting whereby all pro…ts are shifted to foreign a¢ liates with lower tax rates and no taxes are paid domestically.
In high-income countries, by contrast, the fraction of corporations reporting a return between 0% and 0.1% is around 2% regardless of the tax di¤erence to the parent. More generally, the distributions of reported returns are very similar for corporations with low-tax and high-tax parents. Hence, the clear signs of aggressive pro…t shifting that we observed in low/middle-income countries are not present in high-income countries. This represents our …rst suggestive evidence that the exposure to pro…t shifting is larger in less developed countries.
In the Online Appendix, we show that a very similar picture emerges when we group countries according to institutional quality rather than per capita income ( Figure A2 ). This is not surprising given the high correlation between the two dimensions of development. Moreover, we show that measuring the tax incentive for pro…t shifting with reference to the average tax rate facing foreign a¢ liates rather than the tax rate facing the parent has little bearing on the observed patterns ( Figures A3-A4 ).
Regression framework
The graphical analysis has several limitations. First, the simple comparison of corporations with low-tax and high-tax parents only uses part of the variation in the tax incentive to shift pro…ts; it ignores that the tax saving from pro…t shifting is not the same for all corporations with low-tax parents, but proportional to the tax di¤erential. Second, we are e¤ectively making comparisons across corporations operating in di¤erent countries, comparing, for instance, a corporation in South Africa with a low-tax parent to a corporation in Ukraine with a high-tax parent. This is problematic if there are cross-country di¤erences in the propensity to report zero pro…ts for other reasons than pro…t shifting.
We address both of these limitations in the following simple cross-sectional regression model:
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the reported return to assets falls between -0.5% and 0.5%. In the spirit of the bunching literature (e.g. Saez, 2010), we are e¤ectively assuming that …rms cannot fully control their true income and expenses such that pro…ts realized after pro…t shifting may be slightly positive or negative even when …rms aim for exactly zero pro…ts. The speci…c range chosen corresponds roughly to the range in which there is excess mass in the raw pro…t distributions shown in Figures 1a-1b, but given that the choice is somewhat arbitrary, the Online Appendix includes robustness tests where the dummy is de…ned for a narrower interval.
The main explanatory variable is the tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates, tax f or . Given that the equation includes country …xed e¤ects, c , we are e¤ectively comparing the probability of reporting zero pro…ts of corporations in the same country whose incentive to shift all pro…ts to foreign a¢ liates di¤ers because these a¢ liates are facing di¤erent tax rates. The domestic tax rate is not identi…ed in the model due to the country …xed e¤ects.
The parsimony of this novel empirical framework for detecting pro…t shifting is appealing; it requires very little …nancial information and makes no parametric assumptions about the technology that transforms production inputs into pro…ts. It is therefore especially useful in the context of developing countries where …nancial information is often incomplete and measurement error in the …nancial variables is always a serious concern.
Further, we estimate the following panel regression model, which further exploits the time dimension of the data.
The model includes corporation …xed e¤ects and country-time …xed e¤ects and thus ensures that identi…cation only comes from within-country time variation in foreign tax rates. We are e¤ectively asking whether corporations whose foreign a¢ liates experience a change in their corporate tax rate exhibit a change in their propensity to report zero pro…ts relative to corporations in the same country whose foreign a¢ liates experience no changes in their tax environment. When examining how these responses vary with the level of development, we condition on income and governance measured as the average over the sample period.
Note that the use of country …xed e¤ects (in cross-sectional regressions) and countrytime …xed e¤ects (in panel regressions) enhance the robustness of our estimates to a host of factors that introduce error in the measurement of e¤ective taxation and taxable pro…ts.
For instance, our panel estimates are robust to special tax regimes that reduce e¤ectively taxation below statutory rates as long as changes in these regimes do not correlate with changes in the statutory tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates. The same argument applies to the gap between book pro…ts and tax pro…ts: as long as within-country changes in the book-tax gap are uncorrelated with changes in the tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates, identi…cation continues to hold.
Regression results
The cross-sectional results are presented in Table 2 . Estimating the model separately for countries at di¤erent income levels suggests that a 10 percentage point decrease in the parent tax rate increases the likelihood that a corporation reports zero pro…ts by around 3.6 percentage points in low/middle-income countries (Column 1), but only by around 1.6
percentage point in the high-income countries (Column 2). The baseline rates of reporting zero pro…ts (see bottom panel of the table) imply that a 10 percentage point decrease in the parent tax rate increases the share of corporations reporting zero pro…ts by around 20% in low/middle-income countries and by around 10% in high-income countries. The estimated e¤ects of a change in the average foreign tax rate are similar (Columns 3-4).
-Tabel 2 around hereWhile the large di¤erence between the two samples supports the notion that less developed countries are more exposed to aggressive pro…t shifting, we exploit all the underlying variation in development levels across 97 countries by estimating an augmented version of the model for the full sample where the tax variable is interacted with our two development measures: income per capita and the quality of governance. 22 The results suggest that increasing GNI per capita by one standard deviation reduces the e¤ect of a 10 percentage point decrease in the parent tax rate on the propensity to report zero pro…ts by around 0.9 percentage points (Column 5) and reduces the e¤ect of a 10 percentage point decrease in the average foreign tax rate by around the same magnitude (Column 6). Likewise, increasing the quality of governance by one standard deviation reduces the e¤ect of a 10 percentage point decrease in the parent tax rate on the propensity to report zero pro…ts by around 1.2 percentage points (Column 7) and reduces the e¤ect of a 10 percentage point decrease in the average foreign tax rate by around 0.9 percentage points (Column 8)
Analogous results for the panel model are presented in Table 3 In sum, the panel model produces somewhat smaller estimates of the sensitivity of aggressive pro…t shifting with respect to pro…t shifting incentives in both developed and developing countries; however, the estimated development gradient in this sensitivity is strikingly similar in the cross-sectional and panel models.
- Table 3 around hereWe conduct two robustness tests, which are reported in the Online Appendix. First, in order to address the fuzziness of the threshold between zero and non-zero pro…ts, we exclude returns between 0.5% and 2% and thus e¤ectively compare pro…ts that are close to zero to pro…ts that are clearly non-zero (Table A4) . Second, we de…ne the zero pro…ts dummy over a narrower window of pro…tability between -0.25% and 0.25% (Table A5) .
In both cases, the results are very similar to the baseline results reported in Table 5 .
Finally, we re-estimate the model while replacing the governance index with the underlying governance measures (Table A6) . For all combinations of the two tax measures and the six governance measures, our results indicate that increasing governance by one standard deviation reduces the e¤ect of a 10 percentage point decrease in foreign tax rates on the propensity to report zero pro…ts by between 0.6 and 1.1 percentage points.
Given the strong correlation between the governance measures, however, these results should be interpreted with caution. While they corroborate our …nding that aggressive tax avoidance is more prevalent in less developed countries, it is not clear which particular aspects of development are driving this correlation.
Improving identi…cation in the standard model
In this section, we …rst discuss and modify the standard framework for detection of pro…t shifting with the aim of making identi…cation more credible. We then use this framework to investigate whether the sensitivity of reported pro…ts with respect to tax incentives for pro…t shifting varies systematically across countries with di¤erent income levels.
Regression framework
Our regression framework uses the following standard speci…cation for detecting pro…t shifting as a point of departure:
The equation explains the level of reported pro…ts with a set of non-tax variables, the levels of production inputs and corporation and time …xed e¤ects, and a tax variable expressing the di¤erence between the domestic tax rate facing corporation i and the foreign tax rates facing its a¢ liates. Conceptually, the non-tax variables describe true pro…ts under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production technology with time-invariant di¤erences in total factor productivity across corporations whereas the tax term measures the incentive to engage in cross-border pro…t shifting within the corporate group.
This speci…cation raises the major concern that pro…t shifting may be confounded with domestic tax responses. 23 A high domestic tax rate creates an incentive to shift pro…ts to foreign a¢ liates, but also induces other behavioral responses that reduce the tax base, for instance to rely more on debt …nancing as implied by trade-o¤ models of capital structure (Myers, 1984) ; exert less managerial e¤ort as implied by standard models of labor supply (Feldstein, 1999) ; and keep a larger part of the business operations in the informal sector as might be a highly relevant margin of response in developing countries (Gordon and Li, 2009 ). Since the tax term varies one-to-one with the domestic tax rate, it is likely to e¤ectively confound pro…t shifting and a number of entirely unrelated behavioral responses to domestic taxation. These behavioral responses are likely to be especially pronounced in developing countries (Besley and Persson, 2013) .
We improve the identi…cation of pro…t shifting by relying exclusively on variation in the tax rates facing foreign a¢ liates. Speci…cally, we separate domestic and foreign tax rates and augment the model with country-time …xed e¤ects that fully absorb the variation in domestic tax rates. This yields the following estimating equation:
Since all cross-sectional variation in pro…ts are absorbed by the corporation …xed e¤ects, pro…t shifting is identi…ed exclusively from time variation in the foreign tax rates faced by a¢ liates. Analogous to the zero-pro…t panel framework developed in the previous section, we are now asking whether corporations whose foreign a¢ liates experience a change in the tax rate systematically change the level of reported pro…ts relative to corporations in the same country whose foreign a¢ liates experience a constant tax rate.
The identifying assumption is that within countries, changes in the ability of a corporation to transform production factors into pro…ts are uncorrelated with changes in the tax rates the identifying tax variation is (at least partly) domestic. Panel models typically include corporationlevel …xed e¤ects, which nest country-…xed e¤ects; however, in the absence of country-time …xed e¤ects, the identifying time variation in tax incentives still comes from changes in both domestic and foreign tax rates. Three papers e¤ectively identify pro…t shifting solely from variation in foreign tax rates because their sample of corporations are located in the same country and therefore face the same domestic tax rate: Mills and Newberry (2004) and Grubert (2012) for the U.S. and Weichenrieder (2009) for Germany.
faced by its foreign a¢ liates.
It should be emphasized that, even with the improvements we are proposing, this framework cannot capture aggressive pro…t shifting where all pro…ts are shifted to foreign a¢ liates because observations with zero and negative pro…ts are e¤ectively discarded.
Nevertheless, it allows us to measure reporting responses on the intensive margin and therefore represents a natural complement to the analysis of the extensive margin in the zero-pro…t framework.
Finally, before estimating the models, we need to take a stand on the precise de…nitions of the variables. Pro…ts are measured after …nancial income and expenses, which implies that pro…t shifting in the form of interest payments on intra-…rm loans are accounted for in the regressions, but before taxes. Capital is measured as …xed assets, which is in line with most of the literature, whereas labor is measured as the number of employees, which is more commonly available in developing countries than the total wage bill.
Regression results
The results are presented in Table 4 . The estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in the parent tax rate decreases reported pro…ts by around 7.5% in low/middleincome countries (Column 1), but only by around 2% in high-income countries (Column 2). Even more strikingly, a 10 percentage point reduction in the average foreign a¢ liate tax rate appears to decrease reported pro…ts by around 13% in low/middle-income countries (Column 3) while there is no e¤ect in high-income countries (Column 4).
When employing continuous measures of development in the full sample, we …nd that both higher income and better governance are associated with a large and strongly signi…cant decrease in the e¤ect of foreign taxes on reported pro…ts. For instance, a 10 percentage point reduction in the parent tax rate decreases reported pro…ts by around 7% in a country with a per capita income level at the global average; decreasing the income level by one standard deviation raises the magnitude of this e¤ect to 11.5% while increasing the income level by one standard deviation reduces it to 2.5% (Column 5).
Similar e¤ects are found when using the average foreign a¢ liate tax rate as a measure of pro…t shifting incentives (Column 6) and when using governance as a measure of development (Columns 7-8). Finally, our …ndings indicate that the interaction e¤ects between the six underlying governance measures and the two tax foreign tax rate measures are all of roughly the same magnitude (Table A7 in the Online Appendix).
-Tabel 4 around here -
The regressions reported in Table 4 include corporations in 62 countries as compared to 142 countries in the zero-pro…t panel regressions reported in the previous section. The loss of observations occurs because …nancial reporting in developing countries is often incomplete and erratic, which leads to missing information about production inputs and short panels and because observations with zero and negative pro…ts are censored. 24 This highlights that the zero-pro…t framework proposed in this paper is less vulnerable to the data limitations often present in the context of developing countries than existing methods.
It is instructive to compare our estimates to the benchmark provided by a recent meta-study (Heckemayer and Overesch, 2013) . Based on 25 papers that use the standard empirical framework, they estimate that a 10 percentage point reduction in the di¤erence between the domestic tax rate facing a corporation and the foreign tax rates facing its a¢ liates increases reported pro…ts by around 8%. By comparison, our modi…ed framework where pro…t shifting is identi…ed exclusively from foreign tax variation tends to yield larger tax sensitivities than this benchmark in low/middle-income countries and smaller tax sensitivities (close to zero) in high-income countries.
A set of additional results reported in the Online Appendix attempts to reconcile our results with those of the literature. First, we show that when the standard empirical framework is applied to all corporations in the European Union, a typical sample in the studies covered by the meta-study, a 10 percentage point increase in the domesticforeign tax di¤erential reduces reported pro…ts by 6-7% (Table A8) . This is very close to the central estimates of the meta-study and reassures us that our results are not driven by peculiarities of our data source or the sample period. Moreover, we show that the negative correlation between the level of development and the tax responsiveness of reported pro…ts is just as pronounced in the standard empirical framework as in ours:
a 10 percentage point increase in the di¤erence between the domestic tax rate and the foreign parent tax rate reduces reported pro…ts by around 11% in low/middle-income countries, but only by around 4% in high-income countries; the analogous estimates using the di¤erence between the domestic tax rate and the average foreign a¢ liate tax rate as a measure of pro…t shifting incentives are 8% in low/middle-income countries and a borderline signi…cant 1% in high-income countries (Table A9) . Hence, our main …nding that developing countries are more exposed to pro…t shifting than developed countries holds irrespective of the methodological improvements we are proposing.
Concluding remarks
This paper has provided empirical evidence on the link between the tax aggressiveness of multinational …rms and the economic development of their host countries. Using a global …rm dataset with a reasonable coverage in developing countries, we show that the sensitivity of …rms' reported pro…ts to incentives for cross-border pro…t shifting varies systematically with economic and institutional development: less developed countries appear to be signi…cantly more exposed to tax avoidance by multinational …rms. This is consistent with the broader view that developing countries have a relatively low …scal
capacity (Besley and Persson 2013).
A key contribution of the paper is to theoretically identify and empirically quantify the extensive margin of pro…t reporting: when the marginal costs of pro…t shifting are su¢ ciently low, …rms may engage in particularly aggressive tax avoidace whereby no pro…ts are reported by corporations facing high tax rates relative to their foreign a¢ liates.
To compare the signi…cance of the extensive and intensive margins, we need to make one assumption: the true pro…ts of the corporations that shift all their pro…ts to foreign a¢ liates and thus report zero pro…ts are, on average, the same as the true pro…ts of corporations reporting positive pro…ts. 25 Under this assumption, the two margins of reporting are directly comparable. On the intensive margin, the decrease in total reported pro…ts associated with a 10 percentage point decrease in foreign tax rates is 7.5% (Table 4 , Column 1). On the extensive margin, the decrease in non-zero reporting …rms associated with a 10 percentage point decrease in foreign tax rates is 1.5 percentage points (Table   3 , Column 1), which corresponds to a 1.5% decrease in total reported pro…ts under the assumption stated above. This reasoning suggests that the extensive margin adds around 20% (1.5%/7.5%) to the total loss as estimated exclusively from the intensive margin.
The negative relation between a country's development level and its exposure to multinational tax avoidance is very robust and emerges in a wide array of empirical speci…cations, however, it is less clear what causal mechanisms are at play. All our indicators of development, whether related to income or governance, correlate with tax aggressiveness, however, the high correlation between the indicators themselves makes it di¢ cult to disentangle their e¤ects. Credible identi…cation of the mechanisms that lead to low tax compliance in developing countries is an important goal for future research.
A possible mechanism through which less developed countries may be more exposed to multinational tax avoidance is the paucity of targeted anti-abuse rules. A recent line of research documents that anti-avoidance rules successfully limit pro…t shifting; but such safeguards are less prevalent in low-income economies as documented in recent policy work (OECD, 2014). 26 In Table A10 in the Online Appendix, we provide an overview of anti-avoidance rules in a select sample of countries and compare across income levels (based on Johansson, 2016b) . While a clear policy gap remains between developing and developed countries, the gap has narrowed considerably over the past decade with developing countries making the largest legislative advances. If the lack of policy tools are indeed at the heart of the larger exposure to pro…t shifting in developing countries, there is reason to believe that the exposure will decrease in the years to come.
are in line with observed prices in comparable arms-length transactions, reduce the responsiveness of …rm pro…ts to tax di¤erentials; and Buettner et al. (2012) show that thin capitalization rules, which disallow the tax deductibility of interest payments on internal debt exceeding a threshold, discourage the allocation of liabilities to high-tax a¢ liates. Control over corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain; Government effectiveness c aptures perceptions of the quality of public services and civil service and the degree of its independende from political pressures; Political stability measures perceptions of the likelihood of political stability and politically motivated violence; Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulation; Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of expression; First principal component is the first principal component of the 6 governance variables. Total assets is the book value of the total assets; Fixed assets is the book value of fixed assets; Turnover is total sales of a corporation; Profits is net income after financial income and expenses but before taxation; Employees is the number of employees; Return on assets is the ratio of profits to total assets; Zero profits is a dummy variable coded one when the return on assets is between -0.5% and 0.5% and zero otherwise; Domestic tax rate is the corporate tax rate faced by the corporation; Parent tax rate is the corporate tax rate faced by the parent company of the corporation. Average foreign affiliate tax rate is the simple average of the corporate tax rates faced by the foreign affiliates of the corporation. When variables are standardized, we have subtracted the global mean and divided by the global standard deviation. Columns labelled "Low/middle-income" include countries with a GNI (Atlas method) below $12,275. Columns labelled "High-income" include all countries with a GNI (Atlas method) above $12,275. The table shows results from an ordinary least squares regression with observations at the corporation-level for 2010. Variables: zero profits is a dummy variable coded one when the corporation's return to assets is between -0.5% and 0.5% and zero otherwise; parent tax rate is the the corporate tax rate in the country of the corporation's ultimate owner; average foreign affiliate tax rate is the unweighted average of the corporate tax rates in the countries of the corporation's foreign affiliates; GNI per capita is the standardized value of the gross national product in the country of the corporation; Governance is the standardized value of the first principal component of the 6 indicators of quality of governance (control over corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness and political stability). The income and governance variables are standardized by subtracting the global mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Sample: in Columns (1) and (3) the sample is corporations in low/middle-income countries; in columns (2) and (4), the sample is corporations in high-income countries; in Columns (5)- (8), the sample includes corporations in all countries. The number of observations is higher in regressions using the average foreign affiliate tax rate as tax measure because observations for corporations located in the same country as the parent company are effectively dropped when the parent tax rate is used as tax measure. The sample is winsorized by excluding corporations with a return to assets exceeding 96% (the 99th percentile in the gross sample). Standard errors: all reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-level. Statistical significance: *, ** and *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. zero profits is a dummy variable coded one when the corporation's return to assets is between -0.5% and 0.5% and zero otherwise; parent tax rate is the the corporate tax rate in the country of the corporation's ultimate owner; average foreign affiliate tax rate is the unweighted average of the corporate tax rates in the countries of the corporation's foreign affiliates; GNI per capita is the standardized value of the gross national product in the country of the corporation; Governance is the standardized value of the first principal component of the 6 indicators of quality of governance (control over corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness and political stability). The income and governance variables are standardized by subtracting the global mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Sample: in Columns (1) and (3) the sample is corporations in low/middle-income countries; in columns (2) and (4), the sample is corporations in high-income countries; in Columns (5)- (8), the sample includes corporations in all countries. The number of observations is higher in regressions using the average foreign affiliate tax rate as tax measure because observations for corporations located in the same country as the parent company are effectively dropped when the parent tax rate is used as tax measure. The sample is winsorized by excluding corporations with a return to assets exceeding 96% (the 99th percentile in the gross sample). Standard errors: all reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the corporation-level. Statistical significance: *, ** and *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. profits is reported profits; parent tax rate is the the corporate tax rate in the country of the corporation's ultimate owner; average foreign affiliate tax rate is the unweighted average of the corporate tax rates in the countries of the corporation's foreign affiliates; GNI per capita is the standardized value of the gross national product in the country of the corporation (average over the sample period); Governance is the standardized value of the first principal component of the 6 indicators of quality of governance: control over corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness and political stability (average over the sample period); fixed assets is the value of the corporation's fixed assets; employees is the number of employees at the corporation. The income and governance variables are standardized by subtracting the global mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Sample: in Columns (1) and (3) the sample is corporations in low/middleincome countries; in columns (2) and (4), the sample is corporations in high-income countries; in Columns (5)- (8), the sample includes corporations in all countries. The number of observations is higher in regressions using the average foreign affiliate tax rate as tax measure because observations for corporations located in the same country as the parent company are effectively dropped when the parent tax rate is used as tax measure. The sample is winsorized by excluding corporations with a return to assets exceeding 96% (the 99th percentile in the gross sample). Standard errors: all reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the corporation-level. Statistical significance: *, ** and *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
